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Governments around the world have adopted ambitious targets to increase the share of renewable
energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They pursue a variety of policy approaches to achieve
these targets. It has been a popular theme for contributions in Energy Policy to investigate the
effectiveness of such policies. This article adds a new perspective to the debate, namely looking at the
policy preferences of private investors in innovative clean energy technology ﬁrms. We surveyed 60
investment professionals from European and North American venture capital and private equity funds
and asked them to assess the effectiveness of various policies, in terms of stimulating their interest to
invest in innovative clean energy technologies. In addition to quantitative rankings, we use qualitative
interview data to capture additional information on why investors prefer some policies over others. The
combined analysis compensates for the inherent limitations of a quantitative ranking using generic
policy types. The results of this exploratory analysis demonstrate that, all other things being equal,
investors in our sample perceived feed-in tariffs to be the most effective renewable energy policy. The
overall preference for feed-in tariffs is even more pronounced among investors based in Europe and
with higher exposure to clean energy.
& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Venture capital and private equity investments are an
important source of ﬁnancing for innovative entrepreneurial ﬁrms
(Gompers and Lerner, 2004). While venture capitalists have
traditionally focused their investments in a small set of industries
such as information and communication technologies or biotech-
nology (Wu¨stenhagen and Teppo, 2006), there has recently been
increasing attention to ‘‘cleantech’’, an investment category which
consists of renewable energy technologies such as solar energy,
wave energy and biofuels, as well as a collection of other
sustainability related subsectors (Usher, 2008). As experience in
other industries has demonstrated, venture capital and private
equity investments can signiﬁcantly accelerate the market
diffusion of new technologies (Florida and Smith, 1990; Kortum
and Lerner, 2000), despite the fact that the early stage invest-
ments provided by these types of investors are a relatively small
subset of overall investment ﬂowing to clean energy (Usher,
2008). The venture capital and innovation literature offers all rights reserved.
+41712242722.
u¨stenhagen).
nhagen).variety of explanations for the prominent role of early stage
investors in shaping technological innovation and stimulating the
entire investment cycle. One aspect is that early stage investors
aid entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the most precarious stage of the
innovation chain—the ‘‘technology valley of death’’ (Grubb, 2006)
or the original concept ‘‘the cash ﬂow valley of death’’ (Murphy
and Edwards, 2003). Another explanation is that venture
capitalists, by acting as scouts and coaches, are overcoming some
of the inherent information asymmetries that prevent traditional
investors from entering the high-uncertainty business of invest-
ment in new technologies (Hellmann, 2000; Baum and Silverman,
2004). Finally, recent literature points at venture capitalists’
ability to inﬂuence the expectation dynamics of other, less-than-
fully rational investors as a potential explanation for their
importance in the commercialization of innovation (Wu¨stenhagen
et al., forthcoming).
Meanwhile, a particular feature of the energy sector compared
to other investment areas is that it is characterized by a high
importance of regulatory drivers. Therefore, energy and climate
policies have a direct or indirect inﬂuence on the performance of
venture capital and private equity investments in this area.
Understanding investor perceptions of the risks (and opportu-
nities) associated with speciﬁc energy and climate policies may
provide policymakers with an opportunity to leverage private
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targets. On the other hand, policies that are based on a poor
understanding of investor preferences run the risk of crowding
out, rather than facilitating, private investment in renewable
energy technologies. Based on a survey among 60 European and
North American private equity investors, this paper provides
empirical evidence about which policies are perceived to be more
effective at stimulating interest to invest in innovative clean
energy technology ﬁrms.2. Literature review
2.1. Low-carbon innovation policy: technology-push versus market
pull
In his survey of issues and options of technology innovation
and climate change policy, Grubb (2004) outlines the full menu of
approaches that policymakers have at hand to promote low-
carbon innovation (Fig. 1). The challenge is to bring new
technologies from research laboratories to market, and to do so
while surviving the ‘‘technology valley of death’’, namely the
middle phase of the innovation chain where successful prototypes
have been developed but the commercializing ﬁrm is facing the
tough challenge of successful market introduction. It is in this
middle part between government-funded R&D and self-sustaining
funding from customers where innovative technology ﬁrms
struggle most. At the same time, this is also exactly the area
where venture capital and private equity investors focus their
investment, hence understanding their preferences is particularly
relevant (Moore and Wu¨stenhagen, 2004). However, Fig. 1 also
shows that there are a number of other important investors along
the innovation chain. In particular, it is worth noting that
investors further downstream in the innovation chain (e.g.Government
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have the visibility and leverage of venture capital and private
equity investors, but due to the relatively larger funding volumes
are at least equally important when it comes to deploying
technologies that have become commercial.
As can be seen from Fig. 1, policies to promote low-carbon
innovation can basically be divided into technology-push and
market-pull policies. The basic idea of technology-push policies
(such as innovation policies like government-funded research and
development) is to increase the amount of technology ‘‘supply’’.
The rationale for market-pull policies (such as public procurement
or production tax credits (PTC)) on the other hand is to increase
‘‘demand’’ for new technologies and provide ﬁrms and consumers
with economic incentives to apply them. There is a vivid debate
among climate policy scientists and modellers as to which of the
two approaches is more adequate to reach long-term mitigation
targets, with some scholars articulating the need for technology
push in order to come up with breakthrough innovation
(e.g. Hoffert et al., 2002), while others are leaning towards
market-pull instruments based on the assumption that new
technologies only make a difference if they are in fact applied in
the marketplace, and that government’s role should rather be in
stimulating demand for innovative products and thereby
contributing to induced technological change (Grubb et al., 1995,
2002; Dowlatabadi, 1998). At the same time, many experts agree
that the two approaches are complementary. While we concur
that both types of approaches (and a mix of different policies from
each side of the line) are needed, our survey aims at empirically
testing which policies among the entire set of technology-push or
market-pull policies are perceived to be more effective at
stimulating venture investors’ interest to invest. We compiled
the average scores for each generic policy based on the scores
provided to us by the venture capital and private equity investors
that we surveyed and interviewed.ions
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The multitude of policy approaches that governments in
different countries have recently adopted for promotion of
renewable energy has created an interesting experimental setting
for discussions of policy efﬁciency and effectiveness. While early
studies of this topic had to rely on theoretical considerations,
there is now an increasing amount of empirical evidence to draw
on. Much of the earlier discussion was led along the line of
quantity-based (e.g. renewable portfolio standards) versus price-
based systems (e.g. feed-in tariffs). It seemed to be commonplace
in the early days of this analysis that quantity-based systems
outperform price-based systems in terms of economic efﬁciency
(e.g. Drillisch and Riechmann, 1998; Ku¨hn, 1999; Lenz and
Pfaffenberger, 1999). As more experience with practical imple-
mentation was gained, however, it has been increasingly realized
that there are some deviations between the elegance of economic
models and the realities of markets and policymaking processes.
For example, it became soon visible that the UK’s (quantity-based)
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) scheme failed to deliver the
quantities of renewable energy generation that it had aimed for.
Even though the design of the scheme was not the only factor
contributing to the scheme’s failure (Mitchell, 2000), a compar-
ison of effectiveness seemed to result in a lead for price-based
systems as they had been introduced in Denmark, Germany and
Spain (Wu¨stenhagen, 2000, p. 278). In a more recent update of the
UK versus Germany comparison, Butler and Neuhoff (2004) point
out that not only has the UK system been less effective, but they
can also not ﬁnd evidence for a higher efﬁciency, since prices paid
for the amount of wind power that has actually been fed into the
grid are in the same order of magnitude in both countries, despite
poorer wind resources in Germany. Attempts to explain the
success of feed-in tariffs in effectively increasing the share of
renewables have highlighted the fact that it provides lower risk to
investors compared to other support mechanisms (Menanteau et
al., 2003; Langniss, 1999; Lu¨thi and Wu¨stenhagen, 2008).
Quantity-based schemes such as the Renewables Obligation in
the UK are posing price, volume and balancing risks that only
large, integrated energy companies tend to be able to overcome
(Mitchell et al., 2006), which points to a possible positive
correlation between feed-in tariffs and entrepreneurship in the
renewable energy sector (Ragwitz et al., 2007; Toke and Lauber,
2007). Furthermore, a study by the European Commission (2005)
deﬁned effectiveness by the ratio of additional annual normalised
electricity generation to realisable remaining potential until 2020.
The study performed an assessment of the support systems
separately for different renewable technologies. The study by the
European Commission concluded that the most effective systems
inwind energy are currently in Germany, Spain and Denmark with
feed-in tariff systems, although the green certiﬁcate systems,
where they apply, present currently a signiﬁcantly higher support
level than the feed-in tariffs. While wind energy has started to
become a mature renewable energy technology, studying the
evolution of this market provides good insight on which policies
are most effective at creating the right market environments for
new innovative energy technologies. Sawin (2004) concludes that
‘feed-in systems have been responsible for most of the additions
in renewable capacity and generation whilst the record of quota
systems is more uneven’. Finally, other than the effectiveness and
efﬁciency of policies, a long-term and stable policy environment
has been shown to be actually the key criterion for the success of
developing renewable electricity markets (Held et al., 2006)—in
other words, renewable energy policies need to be ‘‘loud, long and
legal’’ (UNEP SEFI, 2004). Obviously the way a country applies any
given policy has a huge impact on its perceived success. For
example, the very stable and supportive policy framework thatwas put in place in Germany and in other European countries for
renewable energy, alongside of the feed-in tariffs, contributes to
the perceived success of feed-in tariffs in Europe.
2.3. Facilitating private investment in renewable energy
Only a few years after authors like Diefendorf (2000) and
Wu¨stenhagen and Teppo (2006) have investigated why so little
venture capital investment is directed to clean energy technolo-
gies, there has been a recent surge in investments in this area. As
Usher (2008) points out, new investment in the renewable energy
sector has matured and has recently surpassed $100 billion per
year, the largest part being asset ﬁnancing of renewable energy
projects such as wind farms or biofuel projects. Venture capital
and private equity has a share of approximately 10% of the overall
investment, but the experience in other sectors shows that these
actors at the beginning of the innovation ﬁnancing chain have a
strong inﬂuence on innovation and economic development
(Florida and Smith, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 2004).
While general factors like increasing awareness about climate
change have probably contributed to the recent sharp increase in
levels of renewable energy investment, an important role is
widely attributed to favorable regulatory conditions in some key
markets such as Germany, Spain or California. However, relatively
little is known about how investors actually view given policy
measures. In one of the few empirical studies in this area, Kasemir
et al. (2000) conducted a policy exercise with six venture
capitalists about European climate policy and concluded that
investors perceive subsidies and tax exemptions as effective
measures. However, there are also indications that venture
capitalists and private equity investors may not be univocally
positive about policy, and that some of them may have a stance
that can perhaps be described as policy aversion. A particularly
pronounced example of this is given by Wu¨stenhagen and Teppo
(2006), quoting a venture capitalist who said: ‘‘If there is no clear
need for the government, make them stay out of the way.’’ There is
anecdotal evidence that some leading venture capital investors
may recently have changed their view about energy policy and are
starting to proactively manage regulatory risk as part of their
overall risk management strategy in this sector (Richtel, 2007;
Bu¨rer and Wu¨stenhagen, 2008). The survey and interview results
presented in this paper are a ﬁrst attempt to move beyond
anecdotal evidence and provide a more comprehensive picture of
venture investors’ preferences with regard to renewable energy
and climate policies.3. Data and methods
In a survey we conducted in early 2007, a principal or senior
fund manager from each of the 60 participating fund management
ﬁrms was asked to rate the effectiveness of policy options in terms
of stimulating their interest to invest in clean energy technology
private equity or venture capital investments. We therefore used a
stated-preference approach rather than relying on revealed
preferences of investors. The advantage of a stated-preference
approach is that we were able to ask about investors’ preferences
with regard to a variety of policies, regardless of which policy had
actually been introduced in their home country, while revealed
preferences (e.g. looking at the actual investment levels that
resulted from introduction of a speciﬁc policy) will only provide
information about one policy at a time. Also, while revealed
preferences can only be observed several years after a given policy
has been introduced, the stated-preference approach allows for an
earlier assessment. Our analysis is based on the assumption that
these empirical results are an indication of how such fund
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decisions in practice when faced with different policy environ-
ments. On the other hand, a major limitation of this approach is
that in order to collect information on a variety of policies, we
were not able to reﬂect the true complexity and interdependency
of policies in our surveys and interviews with investors.
Since private equity and venture capital investors are a time-
constrained population that is notoriously difﬁcult to access, we
chose to leave our respondents a choice between three formats of
answering our questions. They could either participate in the full
version of our web-based questionnaire, or reply to a shorter
paper-and-pencil version, or go through the questionnaire while
doing a telephone interview. In the interviews we were able to
also extract further information about investors’ reasoning.
Answers were evenly distributed between the three formats,
while six of the respondents in the telephone sample expressed
particular time constraints, and hence only responded to an
abbreviated version of the full questionnaire focusing on technol-
ogy-push and market-pull policies.
In the interviews, respondents were asked to rate policies in
the same way as in the surveys, but in the discussion they were
sometimes replying that they never make an investment decision
based on a supportive policy like a subsidy scheme, or in some
cases they were questioning the need for policy at all. We asked
them to explain their views. In many cases they spoke about
trusting ‘‘the power of the market’’ to make correct investment
decisions. They were particularly adverse to market-push policies
that appeared to choose the best technologies. We look at a few
statements from these interviews in Section 4.3 below.
3.1. Description of our sample
Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of the
respondents in our survey. These characteristics were used in our
full analysis of the investors’ individual policy preferences
(Section 4.3). The majority of our sample is evenly split betweenTable 1
Characteristics of private equity investors in our sample.
Energy
experience
Already invested in clean energy 80%
Of those already invested in clean energy:
made last clean energy investment within
last 12 months
97%
Already investigated relevant energy and
climate public policies
80%
Investment
focus (ﬁnancing
stage)
Focus on seed and start-up ﬁnancing 28%
Focus on expansion stage ﬁnancing 44%
Focus on later-stage ﬁnancing 12%
Investing across different stages 16%
Investment
focus
(geographical)
Funds investing in clean energy mostly in
North America
44%
Funds investing in clean energy mostly in
Europe
28%
Funds investing in clean energy in both
Europe and North America
10%
Funds investing in clean energy globally 18%
Location Funds based in North America 50%
Funds based in Europe 50%
Among funds based in Europe, funds
based in the UK
33%
Fund size Small funds (less than 10 million Euros) 27%
Medium-sized funds (10–100 million
Euros)
31%
Large funds (100–250 million Euros) 30%
Very large funds (250–500 million Euros) 12%
Investment
horizon
Expected time to exit (average for all
funds)
6 yearsprivate equity funds based in North America and Europe, and
between small, medium-sized and large funds. Twelve per cent of
the funds interviewed are very large private equity funds with
more than 250 Mio Euros under management. The large majority
of the funds interviewed had active investment experience in
clean energy. We chose this break-up of funds in order to survey
and interview the widest diversity of venture capital and private
equity funds active in the clean energy sector, as possible. This
would allow us to generalize the ﬁndings for the venture capital
fund manager category. We also did not want the average scores
for each policy (the key general ﬁndings of this study) to be too
biased towards either the American or the European continent as
policy experience clearly affects respondents’ views. Therefore, we
made sure we had an equal split among the funds in terms of
geography.
Meanwhile, with the sample characteristics we were able to
analyze the responses according to various fund characteristics.
This led to further understanding the reasoning that investors
have behind their individual policy preferences, and it explained
why certain types of investors tend to have similar opinions.
Besides basic fund characteristics such as clean energy fund
size (clean energy exposure), fund type (e.g. early stage venture
capital or later-stage private equity), ﬁrm size, ﬁrm type, location
of business and geographical focus of investments, we also
collected information on the technologies that the funds had
invested in so far, key drivers for investment, hindering factors for
investment, core investor types, team backgrounds, information
sources, typical time to exit, investment criteria, fund experience
(time since ﬁrst clean energy investment), and time spent with
policymakers versus entrepreneurial ﬁrms. With this information
we identiﬁed relationships between certain fund characteristics
and their various policy preferences and perceptions. We also
supplemented our ﬁndings with qualitative results from inter-
views with some of the investors in our sample. The next section
reviews some of the key results from this analysis.4. Results
We will report the results of our survey and qualitative
interviews in three parts. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present the
descriptive results about investor preferences for technology-
push and market-pull policies, respectively. Section 4.3 presents
the rest of the results and discusses the observed ﬁndings against
the background of investor characteristics such as energy
investment experience, location and fund size and explores some
of the underlying reasons for investors’ policy preferences,
drawing on qualitative interview data.
Before moving into our quantitative ﬁndings on technology-push
policies and market-pull policies, it is important to explain how we
chose the set of both technology-push and market-pull policies. We
started with the idea of the innovation chain and the way policies
interact at different stages of the chain (Grubb, 2004). Indeed, policies
interact in reality but the placement of policies along the chain helps
to visualize where they are most pertinent (upstream or downstream
along the innovation process). We selected a comprehensive list of
policies that are currently being applied quite extensively around the
world. Other than the general term used for the policy, there were no
other details provided about the policies. Investors were asked to
answer how effective these policies are at stimulating their interest to
invest in innovative clean energy technologies. They were asked to
rate the policies in terms of their perceived level of effectiveness on a
scale from 1–5, where 5 was the highest effectiveness score, 3 was
considered moderately effective and 1 was considered low effective-
ness. They also had the option to answer that the respective policy
had no effect or that they did not know.
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country’s policy environment. However, one caveat of this
research approach is that we cannot exclude that respondents
have considered existing policy experiences in their answer. For
example, the production tax credits seemed to be considered in
the context of the current US ‘‘stop and go’’ application of this
policy, which may have led to a negative bias in the results for this
generic type of policy. In addition, the positive experience in
Germany with the feed-in tariff could have contributed to the
positive feedback we received about this particular policy type,
while this positive experience is in the end the result of the full
mix of policies in Germany and not just the feed-in tariffs. In
future work, a focus on fewer policy sets and the use of more
policy details or policy characteristics in surveys or interviews
could address this issue.
4.1. Investor preferences for technology-push policies
The ﬁrst set of policies that we asked private equity investors
to assess are technology-push policies, which range from basic
R&D funding to market engagement programmes and those
strategic deployment policies that focus on early stage, pre-
commercial technologies. Results are presented in Fig. 2.
The two policies receiving the lowest scores (both 2.3) were
government venture capital funds and soft support measures,
such as training entrepreneurs about writing a business plan and
how to gain access to venture ﬁnance. The ﬁrst result provides
empirical support for an observation in the venture capital
literature that ‘‘designing an effective governmental venture
capital program is not an easy task’’ (Cumming, 2007), and yet
it is striking to see the low level of support for government
venture capital funds from their peers in the investment
community, given that there are indeed successful examples of
such policies (Lerner, 1999, 2002). One reason for this low score,
according to our interviews, might be a lack of trust among
investors for the governments’ choice of technologies (or ﬁrms) to
invest in, as the following statement of one investor illustrates:
Government should not choose winners—simply establish
incentives and let the market sort it outFig. 2. Venture capital and private equity investor assesAn alternative explanation, which we could neither conﬁrm
nor reject based on our interviews, might be that these programs
are to some extent competing with the role of private equity
investors, hence there may be a bias in the assessment of
government venture capital funds by these investors. Also, the
low score for ‘‘soft’’ support measures reveals a healthy dose of
skepticism on behalf of the venture capitalists towards the
plethora of networking events and business plan competitions
that are often a cornerstone of innovation policies.
On the other end of the spectrum, the highest score was 3.75
for government grants for demonstration plants. Interestingly, this
score for demonstration grants (or what is apparently the fund
managers’ favorite technology-push policy) is also greater than
most of the market-pull policies discussed below (Section 4.2),
except for feed-in tariffs. This observation gives support to Grubb
(2004) ‘‘technology valley of death’’ hypothesis that the hardest
part of the innovation chain is right in the middle between
laboratory and market, and that hence government support
should extend beyond just funding basic R&D. Against this
background, it appears that countries like Switzerland who had
cut down on their energy pilot and demonstration grants in recent
years were well advised to reconsider their policy priorities (IEA,
2007).
A couple of other policies on the technology-push side were
given relatively good scores. That is, overall fund managers
thought they were effective at encouraging the development of
innovative clean energy technologies, and thus private equity
investment in such clean energy technology ventures. These
included a doubling of public R&D for public institutions (3.39),
the provision of investment subsidies for manufacturing facilities
(3.21), grants for SMEs or communities to install equipment, etc.
(3.21), doubling of R&D for private institutions (3.21) and tax
breaks for entrepreneurs (3.05). Doubling of R&D was deﬁned as
taking the existing amounts of R&D budgets for renewable energy
technologies and doubling them.
4.2. Investor preferences for market-pull policies
Market-pull policies as deﬁned in this paper include strategic
deployment policies relevant to the pre-commercial stage ofsment of effectiveness of technology-push policies.
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commercial stage of technology maturity. Market-pull policies
also include barrier removal policies that are more effective at
deploying already fully commercial technologies than newly
developed technologies. Among such policies are climate policies
such as CO2 emissions trading. Looking at investor assessment of
market-pull policies as presented in Fig. 3, a ﬁrst observation is
that on average they get higher scores than technology-push
policies. Based on our interview results, this seems to indicate that
market-pull policies seem to be at least as important as
technology-push policies when it comes to promoting private
investment in clean energy technologies, while government may
often be inclined to focus on technology-push policies. However,
in our discussions with the investors we interviewed, they
generally agreed that it is not a matter of replacing one set of
policies by another. Instead, those interviewed believed that a
policy mix should include both technology-push and market-pull
instruments, including market engagement programmes, strategic
deployment policies and barrier removal, in order to stimulate
investment along the entire innovation chain and ensure the
continual process of innovation for a variety of new clean energy
technologies which are currently at different stages along the
innovation chain.
Looking at results for individual market-pull policies, a striking
result is that private equity fund managers rated feed-in tariffs
higher than any other policy option provided, reaching an average
score of 4.16 on the ﬁve-point scale. Only 10 out of 60 funds rated
feed-in tariffs with a score of three or lower. Feed-in tariffs also
rank signiﬁcantly higher than the quantity-based instruments
that have traditionally been discussed as possibly superior policy
alternatives, such as renewable portfolio standards and tradable
green certiﬁcates. These two policies rank among the three least
preferred policy options among the private equity investors in our
sample, only being followed by the Kyoto trading mechanisms
(clean development mechanism and joint implementation) as the
policy being considered as least effective in promoting private
equity investment in renewable energy. This makes sense as the
CDM is intended to fund carbon reduction projects in developing
countries, and until now small-scale innovative technology
projects are not particularly favored under this scheme.Other policies that were ranked as rather effective were the
reduction of fossil fuel subsidies (3.56), technology performance
standards (3.54) and residential and commercial tax credits
(3.52), (not to be confused with the congressional production
tax credit which received a lower score).
4.3. Other results
We examined a variety of characteristics of funds to under-
stand the reasons for such differences in policy perceptions. Major
characteristics shown to have a relationship with differences in
their perceptions were clean energy exposure, fund type and stage
of investment. There were also differences between North
American and European-based investors. We will discuss each of
these factors, as well as some particularly insightful ﬁndings on
other aspects, in this section.
As for clean energy exposure, there seemed to be a positive
correlation between the level of clean energy investment and a
fund’s preference for feed-in tariffs. The average clean energy fund
size for funds which rated feed-in tariffs as highly effective was
107 million US$ compared to only 12 million US$ for funds which
rated feed-in tariffs as less effective. Funds which rated feed-in
tariffs as less effective also tended to be mostly general funds
(investing the majority of their funds in non-clean energy related
deals), therefore they may have had less opportunity to experi-
ence the positive implications of feed-in tariffs on clean energy
investments. Another observation is that those funds that rated
feed-in tariffs as highly effective tended to rely more on internal
staff intelligence than other funds, which may be an indication of
their stronger in-house expertise related to renewable energy
markets and policies.
In addition to clean energy exposure, the link between the type
of investment (e.g. early stage venture capital or later-stage
private equity) and assessment of policies has also been
emphasized by one of our interviewees stating that:
How policy impacts investments depends on the attitude of
the investors. Investors in on-shore wind turbine technology
are very different from those in biofuels and fuel cells today.
With wind, you get corporates, which are well-established
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emerging sectors are really option plays, so their regulatory
risk analysis is also far less robusty Experienced investors will
ask if the overall direction of policy is goody The key thing
about policy to stimulate their interest, however, is signal
intent and consistency.
Indeed, in terms of fund type and stage of investment, our results
from the quantitative and qualitative parts of our research show
that funds that focused on the expansion stages (investing in
companies with somewhat of a longer track record) found feed-in
tariffs very effective. Fifteen of such funds rated feed-in tariffs
with a high score (4 or a 5), compared to 3 funds in this category
that rated feed-in tariffs with a 3 or less.
On another point, as in the latter part of the previous quote,
most of the investors interviewed mentioned the importance of
policy consistency. This provides support to previous literature
pointing to the importance of stability in the regulatory frame-
work (see Section 2.2 above). Indeed, some of the positive
assessment of feed-in tariffs may be a result of its long track
record as a stable policy in Germany, so that investors attribute
effectiveness to this particular policy while other policies could in
fact show similar levels of effectiveness when applied with the
same consistency. This phenomenon of investor preferences being
formed by the speciﬁc experience of a policy’s application in real-
life settings is conﬁrmed by the following statements from two
European investors:
Germany, the UK, and sometimes the US have good sized
markets and good policy support, so that is where we are
lookingy I prefer European power policies for renewable
energy like feed-in tariffsy
The most important policy is the feed-in tariff in Germany and
Spain. I am not a big fan of the ROCs scheme. The ROCs system
is not predictable, so it should not be repeated. Tax credits are
not the way either.yProduction tax credits pose a barrier for
European investors in the sector in the US; ﬁrst you need to use
the tax credits, and then in addition, there is the uncertainty in
the regulationy
In terms of geography, among the minority (11 funds) that did
not ﬁnd feed-in tariffs very effective, they were mostly focused on
the North American clean energy market and were based in the
United States (8 funds). Meanwhile, only 18 of the 47 funds that
found feed-in tariffs effective were based in the United States. This
might partly be explained by the fact that there is much less
experience in the Unites States with feed-in tariffs, so those
investors may have been less familiar with this particular policy.
As for North American investors, they rather found the reduction
of fossil fuel subsidies and technology performance standards to
be the most effective market-pull policy choice offered in the
survey.
As for overall drivers, we asked the investors to rank four
possible major drivers of the clean energy industry—competitive
advantage, climate change, security of energy supply and air
pollution. Among these four choices, the main driver according to
the funds was competitive advantage. This was followed by
security of energy supply and climate change. Air pollution was
the least important driver. Large ﬁrms tended to give climate
change a greater importance than small-sized ﬁrms. Small to large
funds gave competitive advantage the most importance and very
large funds ranked climate change and energy security high.
Climate change was more often mentioned as a key driver by
European investors compared to American investors. American
investors tended to mention mostly security of energy supply and
competitive advantage as the key drivers. Related to these key
drivers, in the interviews held, US-based investors also tended tobe more skeptical in general about clean energy support schemes
as a way of increasing investment in the clean energy sector, and
were more likely to refer to the power of market signals such as
high oil prices as the key driver for their investment. For example,
one North American investor said:
Price of oil is more important. Policy plays into the equation,
but you can’t invest where there are government subsidies
because it is not necessarily sustainable. We need more of a
free market approach. We need to strip out the subsidies,
because we are looking for a long-term approach.
On the other hand, there were also more nuanced statements
by North American investors, which concluded that government
support has a role to play, although they would not invest only
based on policy, as reﬂected for example in the following
statement:
We have to be convinced that there is a market and (our
market analysis) includes considering regulations. In general,
policy would affect our decision to invest or not in a deal, but
only by a slight percentage.
Another American investor, who avoided rating policies,
expressed a similar view:
We invest assuming there are no government subsidies at all.
What government can give can be taken away. So, we never
want to invest in anything that depends on a tax credit or a
subsidy. Having said that, if there is a tax credit available, we
will take it. The best subsidy helps get the market started and
then goes away. So, depending on the particular company we
are talking about, or subsidy, we would hope to see a 3–5 years
sunsetting of that credit, and then it has to stand on its own
feet. But as for regulatory issues, it is comical when you go to
every different state and they have different problems.
Standards are needed. Otherwise, I prefer R&D spending over
all the mentioned policies. Money in the hands of entrepre-
neurs gets things done and policies distort markets, although
sometimes they go in your favor. Still, I prefer to look for
businesses that do not need that support.
This healthy belief in the power of undistorted markets and
capable entrepreneurs ‘‘getting things done’’ seemed to be
somewhat popular with several of the investors in our sample.
In particular, when asked about hindering factors for clean energy
technology deployment, fund managers which rated feed-in
tariffs low (3 or less on the ﬁve-point scale) also rated lack of
competent venture managers as high importance and lack of
government commitment as low importance. Along the same
lines, this group of investors tended to have a strong preference
for reduction of fossil fuel subsidies, assuming that eliminating all
subsidies that currently apply to the energy sector would create a
level playing ﬁeld for clean energy technologies, and hence make
further government support redundant.
Among the market-pull options, it is interesting to note that
CO2 emissions trading received the largest diversity of ratings
(many very low, as well as a few very high ratings). Of interest is
to examine how other characteristics of funds might correspond
with a high or low rating for this policy option. As for geographical
location of funds, an interesting ﬁnding is that US-based funds are
more critical about the effectiveness of CO2 trading than European
investors. This may partly be the result of a lack of experience of
US investors with carbon trading, because only Europe has
experience with a mandatory CO2 emissions trading scheme
(the EU ETS).
Differences in opinion on effectiveness of CO2 emissions
trading seemed to be correlated with the funds’ stage of
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funds rated the effectiveness of CO2 emissions trading signiﬁ-
cantly higher than early stage investors and smaller funds. Also,
among those that considered CO2 trading to be very effective,
their clean energy funding compared to their total funding was
small compared to funds that rated CO2 emissions trading with
lower scores. This may be due to the fact that large funds and
later-stage investors tend to invest mostly in technologies at the
later-stages of the innovation cycle. Therefore, as we expected,
these later-stage investors beneﬁt more from CO2 emissions
trading than venture capitalists at the earlier stages of the cycle.
This is conﬁrmed by the following statement from the venture
capital division of a large institutional investor based in
Europe:
Feed-in tariffs are the best perceived policy because they set a
steady cash ﬂow and for us this is importanty CO2 related
policies are like an incentive and down the line it may impact
us, but it is an indirect beneﬁty
Overall, this ﬁnding seems to resonate with Toke and Lauber
(2007) observation that feed-in tariffs are more compatible with
the needs of entrepreneurial ﬁrms than trading schemes, also
from the perspective of their investors.
In a ﬁnal section of our survey, we asked investors to rank
national policy environments as to how favorable they were for
various renewable energy technologies. For solar photovoltaics,
for example, 69% of the investors rated Germany as the most
favorable country (followed by Japan, Spain and the US). Since
Germany also happens to have a favorable feed-in tariff for solar
energy, this seems to correspond with our ﬁndings on this policy
instrument as discussed above.5. Limitations and further research
Our research provides a new angle to investigating the
effectiveness of renewable energy and climate policies by
investigating the preferences of those players who are eventually
supposed to act upon policy incentives, investors. We selected
venture capital and private equity investors as our focus because
of their particular role in the early stages of the innovation chain
where technologies pass through the ‘‘technology valley of death’’.
As an early venture into this new area of research, our work is
subject to a number of limitations that can be the starting point
for further research into the relationship between policy and
investment.
First of all, our research has focused only on a subset of the
investment community—venture capital and private equity fund
managers. While this subset has been demonstrated to be active
at a critical stage of the innovation process, and is therefore
worthwhile investigating, it would also be valuable to extend the
analysis to other kinds of investors, notably in the project
ﬁnancing part of the renewable energy value chain. We would
expect project ﬁnanciers to have a similarly close relationship to
policy incentives, because policies have a fairly direct inﬂuence on
the proﬁtability of wind farms and other large-scale renewable
energy projects. It would also be interesting to survey institu-
tional investors who are important because of the large amounts
of capital that they can potentially provide to fund managers
investing in the renewable energy sector.
Second, our approach to ask investors to rate policy instru-
ments based on their general term and without detailed
description of their speciﬁc attribute levels was a simpliﬁcation
of the real-life complexities of implementing such policies. As the
effectiveness of policies within each category can vary substan-
tially based on how it is designed in detail and how implementa-tion is done, future work should explore ways of capturing more
nuanced policy preferences. This could be done, for example, by
conducting choice experiments with investors where bundles of
policy instruments are described with varying attribute levels
(Lu¨thi and Wu¨stenhagen, 2009).
Third, a limitation of our study is the relatively small sample
size. While the 60 funds in our sample already go clearly beyond
previous work in this area (Kasemir et al., 2000; Randjelovic et al.,
2003; Wu¨stenhagen and Teppo, 2006), notably because until
recently the overall population of venture capital and private
equity investors in the clean energy technology sector was also
quite limited, the recent upsurge in investor interest in this area
opens the opportunity to extend the analysis to larger samples,
which would obviously add to the robustness of ﬁndings.
One fourth limitation concerns the results of quantitative
policy ratings. We believe that combining our qualitative inter-
view results with a quantitative element of rating policy
effectiveness provides some interesting information, however,
the average scores in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 have to be compared
with caution. For example, there were sometimes large differ-
ences in opinion for a given policy among different investor types
(for example, CO2 trading received very diverse scores, but the
average score does not reﬂect this). Also, when we asked about
technology-push policies we were referring to new emerging
technological innovations that are not applicable to the business
of certain private equity investors in our sample. Similarly, when
we asked about market-pull policies we were speaking about
technologies that are already existing and commercially available
on the market, which is not directly relevant to some of the seed-
capital funds or early stage venture capital funds in the sample.
Therefore, we must consider the data we collected on fund
characteristics when we compare policies across these two basic
categories. For example, the market-pull policies are indirectly
impacting the market potential of future technologies and there-
fore policies that are more applicable to the later innovation
stages might receive relatively lower scores from very early stage
investors compared to policies which are more directly impacting
such early stage investors, and vice versa.
Finally, one issue that we brieﬂy discussed in Section 4 and
deserves further attention is the tendency of investors to base
their assessment of policies on their experience with a speciﬁc
application of this policy in one or just a few countries. This may
limit the validity of results in international comparisons. A
classical example that we have mentioned in Section 4.3 above
is that the strong preference for feed-in tariffs presented here was
often connected in interviews to the fact that they have in fact
created a favorable policy environment in Germany. It seems that
there is no easy solution to this issue, not least because similar
policy instruments are applied differently in different countries,
but nevertheless this methodological challenge should be kept in
mind when designing further research.6. Conclusions
Fortunately, there is recently a sharp increase in attention to
the renewable energy technology sector from the private invest-
ment community. While this leads some observers to believe that
energy policy might soon become redundant, we concur with
most readers of this journal that policy will have a role to play for
some time, notably because of the traditionally political nature of
the energy sector and the presence of externalities that make it
challenging for renewable energy technologies to compete on
equal terms with incumbent conventional forms of energy.
Obviously, most venture capital and private equity investors are
not political scientists, so their preferences should not be
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policymaking. Nevertheless, as investors are an important target
audience for policymakers and their investment decisions have an
important impact on markets, it is worthwhile studying their
view about which policies actually work. Venture capital and
private equity investors are particularly important to the innova-
tion chain as they provide the early stage ﬁnancing needed for
new ventures to launch new clean energy innovations onto the
market. However, indeed other investors, particularly project
ﬁnanciers, should be further studied in the future. Their views
would be relevant to policymakers that want to know the
immediate impacts of various policies on major energy infra-
structure projects.
A key ﬁnding from the empirical results is that certain policies,
such as feed-in tariffs, are considered especially effective, by a
wide variety of fund manager types with a variety of character-
istics, at stimulating investor interest to invest in new renewable
energy technologies. This supports previous research suggesting
that feed-in tariffs tend to be an effective way to reduce
investment risk—a feature that seems to be the weak point of
(the real-life applications of) trading mechanisms such as renew-
able portfolio standards or green certiﬁcates. One factor that
might also contribute to the skeptical attitude of venture capital
and private equity investors towards renewable energy and
carbon trading schemes is that they are seen as ‘‘big corporation’’
policies, and hence as having neutral or negative effects on
smaller, entrepreneurial ﬁrms (Toke and Lauber 2007; Schleich
and Betz 2005).
The paper also provides support for an active role of
government in market-pull policies, not just technology-push
policies. Overall, several market-pull and technology-push poli-
cies were rated highly effective showing that adequate policy
indeed does increase private equity fund managers’ interest to
invest in new clean energy technologies. The best technology-
push policy considered was government demonstration grants.
Finally, from the interviews we saw that investors which were not
adverse to policy had agreed that a mix of policies was needed,
that technology-push and market-pull policies were complemen-
tary, and that the most important aspect of policy was that it
should be consistent.
Finally, from the interviews we conducted, it was clear that
especially experienced clean energy investors consider supportive
policy environments as an important way to encourage invest-
ment in clean energy technologies, even though a good policy
environment, alone, is not enough reason for them to invest in a
given deal. However, the interview results also revealed that some
investors (especially some fund managers which invest in a wide
variety of economic sectors) are deeply skeptical about govern-
ment involvement in any form. This view may be a factor that
hampers their entry into this new and emerging sector. There are
two possible solutions to this problem: either, policymakers can
increase their efforts to communicate the beneﬁts of good policies
and educate investors about their rationale; or one can hope that
the market will eventually ﬁgure it out. Investors who are better
at understanding and managing regulatory risks and opportu-
nities are likely to outperform those who are not, as is the case for
any other type of investment risk.Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge funding from the Research Fund of
the University of St. Gallen, Project no. G12221104. The research
presented in this chapter has also beneﬁted from earlier work of
the authors in a project funded by the Swiss Federal Ofﬁce of
Energy under Contract no. 151652.ReferencesBaum, J.A.C., Silverman, B.S., 2004. Picking winners or building them? Alliance,
intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture ﬁnancing and
performance of biotechnology startups. Journal of Business Venturing 19,
411–436.
Bu¨rer, M.J., Wu¨stenhagen, R., 2008. Cleantech venture investors and energy policy
risk: an exploratory analysis of regulatory risk management strategies. In:
Wu¨stenhagen, R., Hamschmidt, J., Sharma, S., Starik, M. (Eds.), Sustainable
Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 290–309.
Butler, L., Neuhoff, K., 2004. Comparison of Feed in Tariff, Quota and Auction
Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, CMI/DAE Working paper 70.
Cumming, D., 2007. Government policy towards entrepreneurial ﬁnance:
innovation investment funds. Journal of Business Venturing 22, 193–235.
Diefendorf, S., 2000. Venture capital & the environmental industry. Corporate
Environmental Strategy 7 (4), 388–399.
Dowlatabadi, H., 1998. Sensitivity of climate change mitigation estimates to
assumptions about technical change. Energy Economics 20 (5–6), 473–493.
Drillisch, J., Riechmann, C., 1998. Liberalisation of the Electricity Supply
Industry—Evaluation of Reform Policies. EWI Institute of Energy Economics
at the University of Cologne.
European Commission, 2005. The support of electricity from renewable energy
sources, COM, 2005, 627 ﬁnal.
Florida, R., Smith, D., 1990. Venture capital, innovation and economic develop-
ment. Economic Development Quarterly 4, 345–360.
Gompers, P.A., Lerner, J., 2004. The Venture Capital Cycle. MIT Press, Cambridge
and London.
Grubb, M., HaDuong, M., Chapuis, T., 1995. The economics of changing course.
Energy Policy 23 (4/5), 417–432.
Grubb, M., Koehler, J., Anderson, D., 2002. Induced technical change in energy/
environmental modelling: analytic approaches and policy implications. Annual
Review of Energy and the Environment 27, 271–308.
Grubb, M., 2004. Technology innovation and climate change policy: an overview of
issues and options. Keio Economic Studies 41 (2), 103–132.
Grubb, M., 2006. Evolution of UK low carbon innovation strategy, presentation for
IPIECA Workshop, Washington, M. Grubb presenting for the Carbon Trust, 27
September 2006.
Held, A., Haas, R., Ragwitz, M., 2006. On the success of policy strategies for the
promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources in the EU, Report
produced for DG TREN.
Hellmann, T., 2000. Venture capitalists: the coaches of Silicon Valley. In: Miller, W.,
Lee, C.M., Hanock, M.G., Rowen, H. (Eds.), The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for
Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp.
267–294.
Hoffert, M.I. Advanced technology paths to climate stability: energy for a
greenhouse planet. Science 298, 981–987.
IEA, 2007. Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Switzerland—2007 Review. Paris:
International Energy Agency.
Kasemir, B., Toth, F., Masing, V., 2000. Climate policy, venture capital, and
European integration. Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (5), 891–903.
Kortum, S., Lerner, J., 2000. Assessing the contribution of venture capital to
innovation. The Rand Journal of Economics 31 (4), 674–692.
Ku¨hn, I., 1999. New competition-based support schemes for electricity generation
from renewable energy sources. Paper presented at the 1st Austrian-Czech-
German Conference on ‘Energy Market Liberalisation in Central and Eastern
Europe’, 6–8 September 1999, Prague.
Langniss, O. (Ed.), 1999. Financing Renewable Energy Systems. DLR, Stuttgart.
Lenz, S., Pfaffenberger, W., 1999. Stromhandel mit erneuerbaren Energietra¨gern
mit einem Quotenmodell. Papier fu¨r die 63. Physikertagung der DPG,
Heidelberg, Ma¨rz 1999.
Lerner, J., 1999. The government as venture capitalist: the long-run effects of the
SBIR program. Journal of Business 72, 285–318.
Lerner, J., 2002. When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: the design of effective
‘public venture capital’ programmes. Economic Journal 112, F73–F84.
Lu¨thi, S., Wu¨stenhagen, R., 2008. Effective deployment of photovoltaics in
Mediterranean countries: balancing policy risk and return. Paper presented
at the DEMSEE 2008 International Conference on Deregulated Electricity
Market Issues in South-Eastern Europe. September 22–23, 2008 Nicosia,
Cyprus.
Lu¨thi, S., Wu¨stenhagen, R., 2009. The Price of Policy Risk—Empirical Insights from
Choice Experiments with European Photovoltaic Project Developers, Paper
Presented at the IAEE European Conference, Vienna, September 7–10, 2009.
Menanteau, P., Finon, D., Lamy, M.L., 2003. Prices versus quantities: choosing
policies for promoting the development of renewable energy. Energy Policy 31,
799–812.
Mitchell, C., 2000. The England and Wales non-fossil fuel obligation: history and
lessons. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 25, 285–312.
Mitchell, C., Bauknecht, D., Connor, P.M., 2006. Effectiveness through risk
reduction: a comparison of the renewable obligation in England and Wales
and the feed-in system in Germany. Energy Policy 34 (3), 297–305.
Moore, B., Wu¨stenhagen, R., 2004. Innovative and sustainable energy technolo-
gies: the role of venture capital. Business Strategy and the Environment 13,
235–245.
Murphy, L.M., Edwards, P.L., 2003. Bridging the valley of death: transitioning from
public to private sector ﬁnancing, May 2003, NREL/MP-720-34036.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
M.J. Bu¨rer, R. Wu¨stenhagen / Energy Policy 37 (2009) 4997–50065006Ragwitz, M., Huber, C., Resch, G., 2007. Promotion of renewable energy sources:
effects on innovation. International Journal of Public Policy 2 (1–2), 32–56.
Randjelovic, J., O’Rourke, A., Orsato, R., 2003. The emergence of green venture
capital. Business Strategy and the Environment 12, 240–253.
Richtel, M., 2007. Tech Barons Take on New Project: Energy Policy. The New York
Times, January 29, 2007.
Sawin, J.L., 2004. National policy instruments: policy lessons for the advancement
and diffusion of renewable energy technologies around the World. Thematic
Background Paper 3, January 2004, prepared for the International Conference
on Renewable Energies, Bonn, Germany, June 2004.
Schleich, J., Betz, R., 2005. Incentives for energy efﬁciency and innovation in the
European Emission Trading System. In: Proceedings of the ECEEE 2005
Summer Study.
Toke, D., Lauber, V., 2007. Anglo-Saxon and German approaches to neoliberalism
and environmental policy: the case of ﬁnancing renewable energy. Geoforum
38 (4), 677–687.
UNEP SEFI, 2004. Communiqu e from Creating the Climate for Change. Sustainable
Energy Finance. Bonn, Germany, 1–2 June 2004 /http://seﬁ.unep.org/ﬁlead
min/media/seﬁ/docs/sef_communique.pdfS.
UNEP SEFI, New Energy Finance, 2007. Global Trends in Sustainable Energy
Investment 2007. UNEP: Paris, June 2007.Usher, E., 2008. Global Investment in the Renewable Energy Sector. in: Hohmeyer,
O., Trittin, T. (Eds.), Proceedings of the IPCC Scoping Meeting on Renewable
Energy Sources, Lu¨beck, pp. 147–154.
Wu¨stenhagen, R., 2000. O¨kostrom-von der Nische zum Massenmarkt. Vdf-Verlag,
Zu¨rich.
Wu¨stenhagen, R., Wuebker, R., Bu¨rer, M.J., Goddard, D. Financing fuel cell market
development: exploring the role of expectation dynamics in venture capital
investment. In: Pogutz, S., Russo, A., Migliavacca, P., (Eds.), Innovation, Markets,
and Sustainable Energy: The Challenge of Hydrogen and Fuel Cells, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) and Lyme (US), forthcoming.
Wu¨stenhagen, R., Teppo, T., 2006. Do venture capitalists really invest in good
industries? Risk-return perceptions and path dependence in the emerging
European energy VC market. International Journal of Technology Management
34 (1/2), 63–87.
Wu¨stenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., Bu¨rer, M.J., 2007. Social acceptance of renewable energy
innovation: An introduction to the concept. Energy Policy 35 (5), 2683–2691.
Wu¨stenhagen, R., Wuebker, R., Bu¨rer, M.J., Goddard, D., 2009. Financing fuel cell
market development: exploring the role of expectation dynamics in venture
capital investment. In: Pogutz, S., Russo, A., Migliavacca, P. (Eds.), Innovation,
Markets, and Sustainable Energy: The Challenge of Hydrogen and Fuel Cells.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) and Lyme (US), pp. 118–137.
